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Executive Summary 
The Five Presidents’ Report, more than any EU document in the recent period, identifies socio-
economic divergences between member states as a major problem in the functioning of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Debates took place in recent years about automatic 
stabilisers, and more specifically about the possibility of introducing an unemployment insurance 
within the EMU. While the need of some form of fiscal risk-sharing has become a dominant view in 
expert circles, there has been much less progress among the main political parties and stakeholders.  
 
This study analyses the political feasibility of the adoption of an automatic fiscal stabiliser (AFS) for 
the eurozone by evaluating actors’ positions towards three distinctive proposals: 1) cyclical shock 
insurance, 2) reinsurance, 3) a European basic unemployment insurance. It includes an empirical 
case study of France and Germany as the most relevant players within the intergovernmental 
bargaining constellation.  
 
Scharpf’s 1  actor-centred institutionalism integrated with Moravcisk’s 2  understanding of the 
European integration as liberal intergovernmentalism serves as the theoretical framework of this 
paper. Actors and institutions are studied at the national and the European level. To determine 
preferences at the national level, actors who participate in the decision-making process have been 
selected (ministries concerned, social partners, political parties) and interviewed (semi-structured 
interviews). Governments’ positions at the European level result from the aggregation of actors’ 
positions at the national level in combination with the intergovernmental bargaining constellation.  
 
The study finds that the adoption of an AFS it currently not politically feasible. The factors that 
determine this outcome are, firstly, that German actors expect to be net contributors. Secondly, if 
an AFS is integrated within the social security system, economically left-wing actors will oppose it 
because they fear harmonisation to a lower standard (race to the bottom), while economically right-
wing actors oppose redistribution in the first place. Thirdly, the decision-making institutions at the 
European level demand a unanimous decision within the European Council so that one country, in 
this case Germany, is enough to veto adoption. Finally, within the intergovernmental bargaining 
constellation, France is currently not in the position to negotiate a compromise in the realm of fiscal 
integration because it cannot credibly commit to a compromise.  
 
However, as political feasibility is contingent on the political context, we urge stakeholders to pursue 
the discussion, as windows of opportunities can open at any time. As a contribution, the authors lay 
out the parameters of the most feasible proposal resulting from the empirical analysis: it is closest 
to the proposal of a reinsurance3. 
 
Keywords: European integration; fiscal integration; eurozone; Economic and Monetary Union; 
European Solidarity; European unemployment insurance; Euro crisis; fiscal stability. 
  
                                                 
1 Scharpf, F. W. (1997). Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
2 Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach. JCMS: Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 31(4), 473. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00477. 
Moravcsik, A. (1998). The choice for Europe. Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht. Itahca, NY: Cornell University 
Press. 
3 Beblavý, M., Gros, D., & Maselli, I. (2015). Reinsurance of National Unemployment Benefit Schemes (No. 401). Brussels: CEPS. 
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Part I: Introduction and framework 
 
1 Introduction: policy context 
 
The eurozone recovered much slower than other major economies from the great financial and 
economic crisis, and in year eight after the beginning of this crisis, it is still struggling. Many attribute 
these difficulties to the architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Therefore, crisis 
management in the EU has been coupled with gradual reform of the EMU (see the series of new 
instruments like the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), six-pack, two-pack, Banking Union). However, no reform has been introduced yet to 
effectively combat asymmetric economic developments, even if the eurozone has been diagnosed 
with serious divergences in a variety of documents, including the Five Presidents’ Report (FPR) in 
June 20154.  
 
Unfortunately, the FPR was noticed by too few at the time of the Greek storm. Nevertheless, Jean-
Claude Juncker, Donald Tusk, Mario Draghi, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, and Martin Schulz outlined in the 
FPR the key arguments for revamping the EU’s economic and monetary structures. They specifically 
propose “a common macroeconomic stabilization function to better deal with shocks that cannot 
be managed at the national level alone”5. This proposal is not entirely new, but it has been part of 
a vivid discussion taking place since 2012. 
 
The Blueprint of the European Commission6 and the report of the four presidents7 of the European 
Institutions Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union8  already proposed a “fiscal capacity, 
an EMU-level stabilisation tool to support adjustment to asymmetric shocks, facilitating stronger 
economic integration and convergence and avoiding the setting up of long-term transfer flows”. In 
2013/14, the Commission, especially the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion actively explored specific tools for automatic fiscal stabilisation, including the basic 
European unemployment insurance (EUI).9  
 
Several policy proposals can be subsumed under the label “automatic fiscal stabiliser” (AFS); they 
all have in common that they allocate contributions and expenditures automatically across member 
states based on a fiscal rule that insures an anti-cyclical effect. These instruments intend to 
marginally stabilise the macro-economic conditions within the EMU. Their goal is not to replace the 
ESM acting as lender in sovereign debt crises, but to act as fiscal stabiliser during ’normal’ business 
cycles. Broadly speaking, AFS proposals can be classified into three categories:  
 
  
                                                 
4 Juncker, J.-C. (2015). Preparing for next steps on better economic governance in the euro area. European Commission. Retrieved 
from http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/docs/economic-governance-note_en.pdf 
5 Ibid. p.14. 
6 European Commission. (2012). A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union: Launching a European debate. 
Brussels. 
7 European Central Bank, Eurogroup, Council, European Commission. 
8 Rompuy, H. Van, Juncker, J., Draghi, M., & Barroso, J. M. (2012). Towards a genuine economic and monetary union. European 
Council. Retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf 
9 Furthermore, two conferences organised by the Bertelsmann Foundation in cooperation with DG EMPL (October 2013 and June 
2014) developed the analysis of the underlying problems and the available options in great detail. Moreover, the Italian Presidency 
organised workshops in 2014 (during the informal meetings of the employment and the finance ministers) on the possible 
introduction of an automatic fiscal stabiliser. 
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1) cyclical shock insurance of national income (CSI);  
2) reinsurance of national unemployment insurance funds, and  
3) basic European unemployment insurance (EUI).  
 
A research project led by the Centre of European Policy Studies and sponsored by the EU10 aims to 
evaluate the feasibility and added value of these different policy proposals. The added value is 
evaluated on the dimensions of macro-economic stabilisation and social outcomes, whereas the 
feasibility is assessed in legal and practical terms. The present study adds an additional dimension 
to the quest for an AFS; the political feasibility. The research question therefore reads as follows:  
 
Which factors determine the political feasibility of the adoption of an automatic fiscal stabiliser 
for the eurozone? 
 
While some authors have speculated about whether the policy proposals are politically feasible, no 
one has provided structured evidence for their conclusions. Yet the political feasibility is of major 
importance for any policy analysis. In Meltsner’s words: “Analysis should lead to policies that can be 
implemented, and the study of political feasibility is one way of bridging the gap between the 
desirable and the possible”11.  
 
In order to determine the political feasibility of an AFS, this papers provides a comparative case 
study of Germany and France12 (empirical analysis). Part I of this paper starts with a theoretical 
framework of the empirical analysis. Part II presents the results of the empirical analysis covering 
actor’s positions, their arguments and the discussion of hypotheses. Part III sets the results in a 
broader context and puts forward the characteristics of a proposal that – based on the empirical 
analysis – has the highest chance of being adopted. 
 
2 Theoretical framework 
 
2.1 Political feasibility 
 
Political feasibility is defined as the probability 
that a policy proposal will be formally adopted. 
The study of political feasibility it part of the 
study of public policy. 
 
So far, explicit conceptualisation of political 
feasibility has been rare. The most prominent 
exception is Meltsner 13 , who introduced a 
comprehensive framework for studying 
political feasibility. Even though Meltsner’s 
framework is still taught in manuals for public 
policy14 , new insights have been developed, 
                                                 
10 Sarrado Mur, O. (2015). Feasibility and added value of a European unemployment benefit scheme. Retrieved March 30, 2015, 
from http://www.ceps.eu/content/feasibility-and-added-value-european-unemployment-benefit-scheme 
11 Meltsner, A. J. (1972). Political feasibility and policy analysis, 32(6), 859–867. 
12 For the case selection, refer to section .3.1.  
13 Meltsner, A. J. (1972). Political feasibility and policy analysis, 32(6), 859–867. 
14 Cf. e.g.: Weimer, D. L., & Vining, A. R. (2010). Policy analysis: Concepts and practice (5th ed.). Pearson, pp 274-285. 
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such as, among others15, the advocacy coalition framework developed in the late 1980s by Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith16 and the actor-centred intuitionalism (ACI) established by Scharpf17 in the 1990s. 
For the conceptual framework, this study mostly draws on the latter since Scharpf’s concept of actor 
constellations (cf. below) focuses on single actors like this analysis does18. Moreover, Scharpf himself 
links his framework to the study of political feasibility: “The primary business of interaction-oriented 
policy research within the framework of actor-centred institutionalism is to […] produce systematic 
knowledge that may be useful for developing political feasible policy recommendations”19. 
 
The following paragraphs serve to summarise the theoretical framework of actor-centred 
institutionalism. 
 
Mixed Approach: Institutionalism and Rational Choice 
 
Actor-centred institutionalism integrates two important public policy paradigms: rational choice and 
institutionalism. It states that actors are not determined but influenced (probabilistic effect) by 
institutions20  (referring to institutionalism), preserving idiosyncratic interests based on intrinsic 
perceptions and preferences (referring to rational choice). From this follows that studying the 
“purposive actors”21 and their interactive strategies is as important as analysing the institutional 
setting that enables and constraints specific strategies and models of interaction.  
 
Actors 
 
Actors play a central role in Scharpf’s framework. To understand the characteristics of specific 
actors, we need to know “their specific capabilities, specific perceptions and specific preferences”22. 
 
Capabilities refer to the resources at actors’ disposal to have an impact on the outcome through 
action. The most important resources in public policy are action resources created by institutions: 
the definition of competencies and the rights to participate, to veto or to make autonomous 
decisions. Additionally, personal properties, technological capabilities, physical resources and 
privileged access to information matter. 
 
The preferences and perceptions denoted as actor orientation are relatively stable but can be 
modified through learning and persuasion. “[T]hey will be activated and specified by a stimulus 
provided by a particular policy problem or issue, and they will refer to the desirable or undesirable 
nature of the status quo, to the cause of a perceived problem, to the efficacy and desirability of 
perceived courses of action, and to the outcomes associated with these”23. Scharpf further divides 
the complex preferences of actors into three components: Basic self-interest, normative role 
orientation and identity24.  
 
                                                 
15 Other frameworks e.g. the institutional analysis and development framework developed by Ostrom (2011) have been considered 
and inform the framework used here.  
16 Sabatier, P. A., & Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (1999). The advocacy coalition framework. In P. A. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of the policy process 
(pp. 117–165). Westview Press. 
17 Scharpf, F. W. (1997). Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Boulder, CO: Westview Press 
18 Contrarily the advocacy coalition framework focuses on policy sub-systems.  
19 ibid. p. 43. 
20 Institutions are defined as „system of rules that structure the course of actions that a set of actors may choose” (Scharpf, 1997b, 
p. 39). It includes legal and social rules. 
21 Ibid p. 36 
22 Ibid p. 43 
23 Ibid, pp.43-44 
24 cf. Ibid, pp.63-66 
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Next to single actors, the actor constellation matters. The constellation denotes “the plurality of 
actors that are involved in policy interaction”25. 
 
2.2 European integration and governance 
 
To study the actors, institutions and the policy process relevant to the adoption of an AFS, as well 
as the likely outcome of the bargaining process, we need a better understanding of European 
integration and governance.  
 
 The adoption of an AFS from the perspective of European Integration Theory 
 
The introduction of an AFS would be another (small) step towards European integration. It can be 
considered as integration because more fiscal competencies are transferred to the European level. 
Therefore, it would also require treaty change (cf. Appendix 1). 
 
Thus, theories about European integration help to understand the policy process that the adoption 
of an AFS is part of. Theories about European integration departed from the opposition between 
intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism in the 1960s. Neo-functionalism is mainly attributed 
to Haas26 and starts from a liberal understanding of international relations. For neo-functionalists, 
once integration had begun, ‘spill-overs’ from one policy field into another reinforce the integration 
process undermining the sovereign state in the long run. Contrarily, intergovernmentalism27  is 
based on a more realist understanding of international relations, as it perceives governments as 
uniquely powerful and rational actors that pursue integration if it best serves their interest. Both 
major theories understand interdependence as the driving force for integration because it makes 
integration the preferable strategy.  
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism28 agrees that the rational state is the main actor in control of the 
integration process but introduces a more liberal understanding of national preference formation. 
Building on Putnam’s29 two-level game, Moravcsik describes the integration process in two steps. 
First, national governments aggregate interests – of which economic interests are estimated to be 
the most important – within their polity. Then, national governments defend their interest during 
the intergovernmental bargaining process among member states. Throughout that process, 
relatively powerful states30 have the most influence over the decision. Liberal intergovernmentalism 
therefore attributes little decision-making power to supranational institutions such as the European 
Commission or the European Parliament. However, it sees institutions as a way for governments to 
make credible commitments. Governments hand power to institutions to implement and enforce 
their commitments.  
 
                                                 
25 Ibid, p.44 
26 Haas, E. B. (1958). The uniting of Europe. Standford: Standford University Press. 
27 Hoffmann, S. (1966). Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation - atate and the case of Western Europe. Daedalus, 95(3). 
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20027004 
28 Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach. JCMS: Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 31(4), 473. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00477.x 
Moravcsik, A. (1998). The choice for Europe. Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht. Itahca, NY: Cornell University 
Press. 
29 Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42(3), 427–460. 
30 Relative power in intergovernmental bargaining depends on many factors. Moravcsik (1993, pp. 499) explicitly mentions three 
factors: “Unilateral alternatives and threats of non-agreement; alternative coalitions and the threat of exclusion; compromise, side-
payments and linkage at the margin”. 
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One of the criticisms of liberal intergovernmentalism is that it ignores the effect of being part of the 
EU on the actors themselves. New institutionalism therefore addresses the issue of how institutions 
affect actors31. Actor-centred institutionalism, as described above, is part of that literature; more 
specifically it is part of rational choice institutionalism. Within the European context, rational choice 
institutionalism is mainly interested in how European institutions structure the preferences of 
individual actors and how collective-action problems can be solved through institutions and 
strategic action32. 
 
The broad framework of this research therefore draws on liberal intergovernmentalism to 
understand the political process to adopt an AFS. Liberal intergovernmentalism is appropriate 
because national governments are the most important actors in the final decision-making process, 
while EU institutions like the European Commission and European Parliament only play a marginal 
role. So the process leading to a decision can be characterised as intergovernmental bargaining. This 
understanding is supported by Schimmelfennig 33 . He convincingly shows how liberal 
intergovernmentalism is an adequate framework to study the political resolution of the eurozone 
crisis, and that institutions of financial assistance have been adopted in a logic of intergovernmental 
bargaining. While liberal intergovernmentalism is the broad setting, actor-centred institutionalism 
helps us to understand the preference formation at the national level, at the origin of the 
intergovernmental bargaining positions.  
 
 European Institutions and the likeliness of adopting social policies 
 
With regards to policy substance, an AFS is a fiscal instrument with at least short-time redistributive 
implications. Moreover, some kinds of AFSs proposed are integrated with national social policies. 
An AFS is thus often seen as an instrument to advance ‘Social Europe’. This section sums up the 
literature essential to studying the interaction between European institutions and the specific policy 
substance of redistributive and social policies. The relevant strand of literature is interested in 
European governance and thus treats the EU as the independent variable, studying its impact on 
national and European policy-making34.  
 
Two lines of argument are most relevant to an AFS: first, Majone 35  suggests that the EU is 
institutionally better equipped to regulate than to redistribute. Regulation can be achieved without 
a large budget and regulations are often less conflict-ridden than redistributive policies, because the 
winners and losers are less explicit. Moreover, based on the assumption of a democratic deficit of 
the EU, Majone suggests that the EU should focus on regulations that are (close to) Pareto efficient 
instead of redistributive policies, because the former can be based on a “non-majoritarian source of 
legitimacy”36 (Majone, 1998, p. 28). He concludes: “The evidence I have presented strongly suggests 
that the 'Social Europe' of the future […] will be, not a supranational welfare state, but an 
increasingly rich space of social-regulatory policies and institutions”37. 
                                                 
31 Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. (1996). Political science and the three new institutional isms. Political Studies, 44(5), 936–57. 
32 ibid. 
33 Schimmelfennig, F. (2015). Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(March), 
177–195. doi:10.1080/13501763.2014.994020 
34 Jachtenfuchs, M. (2001). The governance approach to European integration. Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(1), 245–261. 
35 Majone, G. (1993). The European Community between social policy and social regulation. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(2), 
153–170. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00455.x; Majone, G. (1994). The rise of the regulatory state in Europe. West European 
Politics, 17, 77–101. 
36 Majone, G. (1998). Europe’s “democratic deficit”: The question of standards. European Law Journal, 4(1), p.28. doi:10.1111/1468-
0386.00040 
37 Majone, G. (1993). The European Community between social policy and social regulation. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(2), 
p.168. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00455.x 
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Second, Scharpf38 has developed an argument about positive and negative integration, based on his 
insights into the “joint decision trap” (Scharpf, 1988). Negative integration is defined as common 
market integration by decreasing national constraints on markets, whereas positive integration 
designates common policies that shape the conditions under which the European market 
operates39.  
 
Scharpf argues that positive integration in the realm of social and welfare policies is rare because 
the adoption of such policies require a qualified majority or unanimity in the Council. Hence, 
decisions can only be reached under specific actor constellations. Yet, when studying the actor 
constellation with regards to social policies, Scharpf concludes that an agreement will not be 
reached because national welfare states differ too much. Richer countries, for instance, 
systematically spend higher percentages of their national income on social protection than poorer 
countries do. Thus, richer countries fear that a compromise at the European level would lead to 
harmonisation at a lower level, whereas poorer countries fear losing their relative competitive 
advantage when harmonisation is reached at higher levels. 
 
In conclusion, both Majone and Scharpf argue that EU institutions are not conducive to the 
establishment of redistributive social policies. Following their theoretical argument, the adoption of 
an AFS is highly unlikely, especially if it is highly redistributive and integrated with national welfare 
states.  
 
3 Design of this study 
 
In accordance with the theoretical framework presented above, this study looks at the preference 
formation at the national level and the intergovernmental bargaining constellation to determine 
the likely outcome of negotiations. The formation of national preferences from the positions of 
national actors will be at the centre of the empirical inquiry. This section presents the case selection, 
the selection of actors studied and proposes hypotheses that guide the empirical analysis. 
 
3.1 Selection of cases: France and Germany  
 
As this research is about political feasibility, analysing the member states with the largest 
capabilities is most relevant. France and Germany have the largest capabilities in terms of economic 
and demographic weight. Together they produced 49,96% of the GDP (2013 current market prices40 
within the eurozone and represent 43,8% of the population41. Politically, the importance of France 
and Germany for advancing the European integration process has been widely acknowledged.  
 
  
                                                 
38 Scharpf, F. W. (1996). Negative and positive integration in the political economy of the European welfare states. In Governance in 
the European Union (pp. 15–39). London: Sage Publications.; Scharpf, F. W. (1997b). Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered 
Institutionalism in Policy Research. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.; Scharpf, F. W. (2009). The double asymmetry of European 
integration: Or: why the EU cannot be a social market economy. MPlfG working paper. 
39 Scharpf, F. W. (1996). Negative and positive integration in the political economy of the European welfare states. In Governance in 
the European Union (pp. 15–39). London: Sage Publications. 
40 Eurostat. (2014). Gross domestic product at market prices. Retrieved October 10, 2014, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00001 
41 Eurostat. (2014b). Population on 1 January. Retrieved October 10, 2014, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00001&plugin=1 
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3.2 Units of observation: actors forming national preferences 
 
Political actors playing a decisive part in the formulation of national preferences are the units of 
observation. The selection follows Scharpf’s concept of actor constellation that includes the primary 
actors involved in the policy-making process42. Thus, actors selected include political parties, unions, 
employer associations, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Finance and the President/Chancellor. 
These observations depend on one another. 
 
3.3  Overview of levels of analysis, institutions and actors 
 
Figure 2 provides an overview for a better understanding of how actors (circles) are situated within 
the institutional context of Germany. Two circles of the same colour connected with a line refer to 
the same actor, but in another function; e.g. the Ministry of Finance is part of the national 
government and the ECFIN. Arrows reflect relationships between institutions. 
 
 
  
                                                 
42 Scharpf, F. W. (1997b). Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
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3.4 Formation of actors’ positions  
 
This study is interested in the subjective causal model of each actor, i.e., it investigates the action 
orientation of each actor (hereafter called actor position) as well as the main reasons explaining this 
position (cf. Figure 3).  
 
Actors’ positions towards the introduction of 
an AFS are categorised according to the 
degree of their approval:  
 
1) total rejection,  
2) reluctant openness,  
3) conditional approval, 
4) unconditional approval.  
 
Section 6 will explain these categories in more 
detail. 
 
To further study the nature of actors’ 
positions, the different policy proposals on 
AFSs have been broken down into their 
substantive structural dimensions43 . During the interviews, actors were confronted with these 
dimensions to define the set of conditions that would make their approval most likely. A sample of 
these dimensions are presented in Table 3 while the full list is provided in Appendix 2. The 
underlying reasons for the actors’ positions include factors such as economic interests, political 
identity, preference of constituency etc. The hypotheses in the following section serve as a 
framework of analysis to identify which of these reasons are the driving factors of the actor’s 
position. Additionally, an analysis of institutions at the national level helped to guide the analysis of 
each actor. 
 
                                                 
43 Policy proposals always have some characteristics, here called ‘dimension’. For instance, income tax can vary according to the 
taxable income. Hence, we could call this dimension ‘variation of tax rate’. If we now study different income tax proposals, we need 
to have a criterion that shows how each proposal ranks on this dimension. We could ask: “How does the tax rate vary in relation to 
taxable income?” The possible answers to this question are the values an observation can take on in this dimension. In this case, the 
possible values are: regressive, flat, progressive. This process has been done for the AFS proposals that have been studied. 
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3.5 Hypotheses 
 
 National preferences: actors’ positions at the national level 
 
From the theoretical framework and design of this study, the following hypotheses for actors at 
the national level can be deduced: 
 
 H1: Actors, who expect to be net contributors, will be relatively more opposed to the 
introduction of an AFS (prevalence of economic preferences44. 
 H2: Actors, who ideologically belong more to the centre-right and generally oppose increases 
of redistribution at the national level, will be more opposed to an AFS than actors commonly 
favouring more redistributive policies (centre-left with regards to welfare policies). This 
hypothesis refers to the importance of identity in an actor’s position45. 
 H3: Actors favouring more redistributive policies oppose suggestions that imply the 
harmonisation of national welfare systems since they fear a harmonisation to a lower 
standard46. Additionally, they fear the loss of power, if a competence like unemployment 
insurance would be transferred to the European level. 
 
Taken together, these hypotheses suggest that German actors are generally more hostile towards 
an AFS because they expect to be net contributors (H1). Yet, both in France and Germany, left-
wing actors should generally be more open to the proposal of an AFS in comparison to their 
national right-wing counterparts (H2). Nevertheless, they object proposals that affect national 
unemployment insurance schemes (H3). 
 
 Intergovernmental bargaining: actor constellation at the European level  
 
Aggregating preferences to the European level as proposed by Moravcsik47, combining it with the 
insights from the literature on European integration and governance and the specific actor 
constellation, the following hypotheses have been established: 
 
 Ha: Due to the capacities and decision-making procedures at the European level, in 
combination with redistributive and welfare-related implications of an AFS, an adoption is 
very unlikely48.  
 Hb: Aggregating from the actor level, Germany as a whole is an expected net contributor (at 
least in the short run), whereas France’s contributions would more or less balance out so that 
they could benefit from increased macro-economic stability in the eurozone without 
contributing much. Therefore, Germany will oppose an AFS whereas France will (partly) 
support it  
 Hc: The intergovernmental bargaining constellation results in a third hypothesis that 
aggregates all insights from previous hypotheses: France would favour fiscal integration 
because they could potentially profit from it, while Germany demands obedience to fiscal 
                                                 
44 c.f. Moravcsik, A. (1998). The choice for Europe. Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht. Itahca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
45 c.f. Scharpf, F. W. (1997). Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
46 Scharpf, F. W. (1996). Negative and positive integration in the political economy of the European welfare states. In Governance in 
the European Union (pp. 15–39). London: Sage Publications. 
47 Moravcsik, A. (1998). The choice for Europe. Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht. Itahca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
48 Majone, G. (1993). The European Community between social policy and social regulation. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(2), 
153–170. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00455.x; Scharpf, F. W. (1996). Negative and positive integration in the political economy 
of the European welfare states. In Governance in the European Union (pp. 15–39). London: Sage Publications. 
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rules since fiscal discipline reduces its expected future costs of integration. This hypothesis 
suggests that France and Germany could link their demands so that both advance with regard 
to their fiscal preference. Given that the present inquiry departs from suggestions for more 
fiscal integration, German actors are expected to demand the obedience of fiscal rules and 
the commitment to structural reforms in exchange for future fiscal integration.  
 
Together, these hypotheses suggest that an adoption of an AFS is very unlikely in any event (Ha), 
that the veto of Germany will make it impossible (Hb) and that the only possibility that Germany’s 
position could change in the future is linked to the willingness of France (and other southern 
European countries) to credibly commit to fiscal rules and national structural reforms that would 
lower Germany’s anticipated costs (Hc). 
 
3.6 Methods of evidence collection and analysis 
 
Evidence has been collected through 24 semi-structured in-depth interviews with representatives 
of each selected actor49 (cf.  Section 3.2) (elite interviews). The interviews lasted approximately 
60 minutes and took place in the first quarter of 2015. Further evidence has been gained at the 
CEPS Ideas Lab in Brussels in February 2015, where a workshop on the topic was held. 
 
Internet-based research completed the evidence collection. For example, for political parties, 
manifestos for the elections of the European Parliament in 2014 and other policy documents have 
been analysed. Moreover, official proceedings and reports of national and local parliaments have 
been consulted. Hence, next to the interviews, primary and secondary sources have been 
accessed and analysed using atlas.ti. 
 
  
                                                 
49 Due to problems of access, no formal interview took place with a representative of the Elysée. 
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Part II: Empirical analysis 
 
The analysis proceeds in five steps: First, the policy proposals on the basis of the empirical analysis 
are introduced. Then the positions of actors are described. The third step entails a discussion of 
actors’ arguments. Fourth, the reasons underlying actors’ positions are examined along the 
hypotheses. Finally, parameters of the most feasible proposal are lined out in Part III. 
 
4 Three types of policy proposals50  
 
The empirical investigation starts with three policy proposals. The Cyclical Shock Insurance (CSI)51, 
the reinsurance of national unemployment insurance funds mainly developed by CEPS52 and the 
basic European unemployment insurance (EUI) developed by Sebastian Dullien53 
 
The CSI is a purely macroeconomic instrument proposing automatic transfers from member states 
that are above the EMU-wide average position within business cycles to member states that are 
below the average based on the output gap. The reinsurance is a supranational insurance for large 
unemployment shocks with a fixed deductible for member states paying yearly premiums. The 
EUI proposes a basic unemployment insurance at the eurozone level that could be supplemented 
by national schemes.  
 
All proposals simulate how contributions and payouts would have been in the past. However, the 
simulations are influenced by the many assumptions they are based on and do not take into 
account the endogenous effect of the instrument on growth and employment. Therefore, results 
from the simulations will not be presented here. What matters for the present study is that during 
the last years, France would have profited more from any of the proposed instruments than 
Germany. Hence, Germany expects to be a relatively larger net contributor in the short run.  
 
4.1  Actors’ position in comparison54 
 
The position of actors was sorted into four categories (cf. Figure 4). All actors opposing any kind 
if AFS are in the category ‘total rejection’. When it comes to the main reason of their opposition, 
two groups can be distinguished; on the one hand, there is the group of conservative/business-
friendly actors who believe the current problems of the EMU to result from structural problems 
at the national level, whereas the weaknesses at the EMU level have been resolved by recent 
reforms. Their main objection to an AFS is that it would create moral hazard for national 
governments to further postpone national structural reforms. On the other hand, there are the 
                                                 
50 This section does not provide an exhaustive overview of all proposals and its variations but only introduces those studied here. 
51 Enderlein, H., Spiess, J., & Guttenberg, L. (2013). Blueprint for a cyclical shock insurance in the euro area. Notre Europe, Jacques 
Delors Institute. 
52 Beblavý, M., Gros, D., & Maselli, I. (2013). The European unemployment insurance 2.0.: the reinsurance mechanism. In Economic 
shock absorbers for the Eurozone. Deepening the debate on automatic stabilizers. European Commission. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=88&langId=de&eventsId=992&moreDocuments=yes&tableName=events&typeId=92; 
Beblavý, M., Gros, D., & Maselli, I. (2015). Reinsurance of National Unemployment Benefit Schemes (No. 401). Brussels: CEPS.; Beblavý, 
M., & Maselli, I. (2014a). An Unemployment Insurance Scheme for the Euro Area: A simulation exercise of two options (No. 98). 
Brussels: CEPS.; Beblavý, M., & Maselli, I. (2014b). Time for some shock (absorption ): Reinsurance of national unemployment. CEPS. 
53  Dullien, S. (2013). A European unemployment benefit scheme: How to provide for more stability in the euro zone. 
(Bertelsmannstiftung, Ed.). Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung.; Dullien, S., & Fichtner, F. (2013). A common unemployment 
insurance system for the euro area (No. 1). DIW. 
54 The assessment of actors’ position is based on publically available information and the conducted interviews. There is always some 
doubt about whether or not the views shared by the interviewee are representative of the actor.  
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Eurosceptic parties who reject any kind of AFS because they think that the challenges of the 
eurozone cannot be solved by deeper integration but by dissolving the eurozone. 
 
The group of actors within the category ‘reluctant openness’ is the largest and the most 
heterogeneous. Their common ground is that they generally agree that the eurozone requires 
some sort of fiscal instrument to fully live up to its potential. Yet, no proposal has convinced them 
so far, or they have different priorities. What separates the actors within this category from those 
in ‘conditional approval’ is that they will not actively propose an AFS. Yet, a small chance exists 
that they would passively agree if a specific proposal meets their interest. 
 
The category ‘conditional approval’ includes actors that are in favour of an AFS but would not 
agree to any proposal. Some of the actors in this category have very clear ideas about how an AFS 
should look like. For example the Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT) 55 
favours a proposal similar to the reinsurance while Ministère de l'Économie, de l'Industrie et du 
Numérique (Economie) favours an EUI. Others, like the Parti Socialiste (PS) are waiting for a 
suitable proposal. Actors in this category show active support. For instance, the PS has published 
its support of an AFS before the elections of the European Parliament in 201456.  
 
Only one actor falls within the category of ‘unconditional approval’. Even though the Trésor 
prefers an EUI, they are so convinced that the eurozone needs a budgetary capacity, including an 
automatic stabiliser, that they would agree to other proposals as long as they represent a change 
in the right direction.  
 
When looking at Figure 4 it is evident that the vast majority of actors is situated in the lower half. 
These actors will not actively pursue an AFS. Importantly, some of the most powerful actors are 
found in this lower half, such as the Bundeskanzleramt (BK), Bundesministerium der Finanzen 
(BMF), Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU), Union pour un Mouvement Populaire 
(UMP) and Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (SPD).  
 
Concerning the position of the different actors, one can observe some general patterns: German 
actors are on average more sceptical towards an AFS then their French counterparts, while actors 
on the political right are more sceptical than left-wing actors57. 
 
Apart from the position itself, several actors referred to the relative salience of the issue. For 
instance, the BK, BMF Economie and CDU indicated that they thought the issue is not high up on 
the European agenda. French government actors (Economie, Trésor, Ministère du Travail, de 
l'Emploi, de la Formation professionnelle et du Dialogue social (Emploi)) mentioned that their 
respective minister does not consider it to be a priority. Additionally, French Economy Minister 
Emmanuel Macron stated publically that in the short run the focus lies on investments and 
reforms, while the issue of fiscal solidarity should follow later58. Similarly, many actors (SPD, 
Industriegewerkschaft Metall (IGM), Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) and CFDT indicated 
that their immediate goal is to end austerity and to increase investment. 
 
                                                 
55 The label of an actor in italics indicates that the information is based on the respective interview. 
56 Weber, H. (2014). 74 questions et réponses pour réorienter l’Europe. Retrieved from 
http://www.parti-socialiste.fr/static/11078/documents/74-questions-et-reponses-pour-reorienter-leurope_0.pdf 
57 Ministries are assigned to the political left or right depending on the party affiliation of the current minister.  
58 Macron, E. (2015, April 31). A new deal for Europe: Reforms, investment, and growth. Berlin. 
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To sum up, due to the opposition (BK, CDU, BMF59) or only very weak support (UMP, SPD) of key 
actors and the relatively low importance attributed to the issue, Figure 4 indicates that the 
adoption of an AFS is currently not feasible. The following sections, especially the discussion of 
the hypotheses, will provide further evidence. 
 
 
                                                 
59 Abbreviations in italics within a bracket indicate that the preceding statement was confirmed by the actor mentioned in that 
bracket. 
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5 Arguments justifying the actors’ positions 
 
The following sections cover arguments brought forward by the actors in support of their position. 
 
5.1 Arguments applying to AFS in general 
 
The main argument in support of AFS is the acknowledgment that the EMU requires an anti-
cyclical fiscal capacity to be fully functioning, and more specifically, ready to deal with asymmetric 
shocks (CFDT, Medef, Economie, Emploi, PS, Trésor, UMP, Bundesministerium für Arbeit und 
Soziales (BMAS), DGB, and SPD). This argument is based on the acknowledgement of a spill-over 
effect (cf. neo-functionalism) from a single monetary policy to more integrated fiscal policies. In 
the words of the Bündnis90/Die Grünen (Grüne), this support reads as follows: “We support an 
instrument with a stabilising effect on European economies and labour market: An 
unemployment insurance could be one of several stabilisation instruments that could contribute 
to smoothing overheated business cycles, reduce bubbles and cushion acute crisis 
situations.”60;61. Or, as a representative of the PS said: “An AFS is needed for the viability, cohesion 
and unity of the eurozone”. Two of the French actors (Emploi, PS) indicated that the French 
political establishment acknowledges that a fiscal union is required. Even the French employer 
association Medef thinks that a discussion about fiscal transfers is needed.62  
                                                 
60 All citations form German and French actors are translations from the original language by the author. 
61  Bundesvorstand Arbeiterwohlfahrt. (2014). Parteien auf dem Prüfstand: Wahlprüfsteine des AWO Bundesverbandes zur 
Europawahl 2014. Retrieved March 5, 2015, from https://awowahlpruefsteine.wordpress.com/category/a-awo-wahlprufsteine/6-
arbeit-und-beschaftigung/6-c-europaische-arbeitslosenversicherung/ 
62 On 31 March 2015, the Medef’s Director-General publically stated its support of an EUI. As the information could not been 
reconfirmed before the deadline, it was not taken into consideration (Knuf, 2015).  
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However, some actors, while acknowledging the theoretical desirability of an AFS, stress the 
preconditions under which such a mechanism would be acceptable. The preconditions mostly 
relate to fair framework conditions, which imply a level playing field for fiscal and social policies 
to prevent social and fiscal dumping (IGM, DGB, BMAS, UMP, SPD). To illustrate that point, a 
representative of the SPD explained that it is difficult to defend transfers to, for instance, Ireland. 
Voters would point out that many companies are registered in Ireland due to low corporate 
taxation. As long as the Irish do not show solidarity on fiscal policies, German voters would reject 
support. Therefore, the BMAS pointed out that an AFS would come at the end and not at the 
beginning of a process of policy harmonisation. The BK added that they would not exclude a 
fiscal mechanism in the long run if preconditions would be built in the AFS. Yet, in their opinion, 
there seems to be no intention to do so. 
 
Whereas the first argument is based on the economic rationale and the goal of fiscal stability 
within the eurozone, other actors support an AFS (especially an EUI) because they think it could 
increase solidarity and a stronger identification of citizens with the EU/eurozone (SPD, CFDT, 
Trésor, Economie, Grüne). The Economie pointed out that the EUI would be in the spirit of the 
“Europe des citoyens”. However, all actors agreed that economic and fiscal stability is the 
principal goal of an AFS. 
 
The main argument against an AFS is moral hazard induced by any kind of insurance mechanism 
(CDU, IGM, Gesamtmetal (GM), Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA) 
BK, BMF, BK, BMAS, Medef, SPD, UMP, Trésor). It implies that member states would act less 
responsibly if they think they do not have to bear the whole costs of potential (national) crises. 
Moreover, in times of crises, they would invest less to decrease unemployment rapidly since 
member states bear the costs of active labour market policies but only part of the cost of passive 
labour market policies.  
 
Closely related to the argument of moral hazard is the perception that the main problems in the 
eurozone are not of a cyclical but of a structural nature. For example, many actors mentioned 
that a large part of unemployment in member states with economic difficulties is structural and 
not cyclical (BDA, GM). Therefore, any instrument that could dissuade member states to 
implement structural reforms is harmful. Wrong incentives induced by moral hazard would 
weigh heavily since structural reforms of labour markets are politically unpopular. Some actors 
doubted whether Germany would have implemented such wide-reaching reforms at the 
beginning of the years 2000 if an AFS had been in place at the time (BDA, BK, CDU). 
 
Actors also oppose mechanisms that lead to permanent transfers between member states 
because they would create a eurozone of net recipients and net contributors in the long run 
(SPD, Grüne, BMAS, PS, Front National (FS)), resulting in political tensions. High permanent 
transfers would be problematic both for recipients and contributors. In Germany, some actors 
made a comparison with the “Länderfinanzausgleich” and explained how visible transfers create 
tensions (BMAS, IGM). 
 
Some German actors explicitly oppose an AFS because they expect Germany will be a net 
contributor to the scheme (BK, CDU, IGM). For instance, BK suggests that the German 
government has to protect German taxpayers. The representative of the CDU goes one step 
further and calls any suggestion similar to the AFS an instrument that will be used by Italy, France 
and other countries to get German funds.  
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The expectation of being a net contributor seems to be connected to the public opinion of the 
core constituency. At present, the mainstream popular opinion in Germany as expressed by the 
media63 opposes transfers towards other member states. The main perception in Germany is that 
they have gone through painful reforms in the past and therefore should not pay for those who 
did not do their “homework” (BDA, CDU). The population concurs with the dominant discourse of 
the Chancellor and the Minister of Finance about fiscal consolidation. Actors who do not share 
this view have not yet found a way to influence the public discourse significantly. Both the Grüne 
and the SPD expressed concerns that even though net contribution is not necessarily a problem 
according to the party’s point of view, it is for their voters. To give some examples; a 
representative of the SPD explained that he has major problems explaining to voters the long-
term benefits for Germany of transfers on the EU level (such as the structural funds). The same is 
true for the IGM; they observed that many of their members voted for the Eurosceptic Alernative 
für Deutschland (AfD) in the last elections for the European Parliament.  
 
Eurosceptic forces develop a somewhat different argument. They oppose an AFS because it would 
be an instrument of the eurozone. The Eurosceptic forces in France, including the Front National 
and parts of the Front de Gauche (Gauche) (far-left party), perceive the euro as an “instrument 
serving an ultra-liberal, globalisation-friendly ideology and the interest of the financial sector”64. 
In their understanding, the euro mostly serves Germany as it benefits from the weak exchange 
rate. Simultaneously, Germany has “killed the eurozone” (Gauche) with its policies of keeping 
wages low alongside the current account surplus. The difference between the extreme right and 
the extreme left in France is that the right opposes the EU in toto and wants to abolish it. The left 
on the other hand supports deeper integration but thinks that the preconditions for a functioning 
EMU are not in place and that there is no political will to put them in place. As the EMU is 
dysfunctional it should be abandoned. The AfD expressed similar, yet somewhat different 
opposition to the euro since it relates most of its criticism to the policies undertaken during the 
euro crisis. The AfD explicitly opposes an EUI65. 
 
While some of the actors agree that cyclical problems, especially in case of asymmetric 
developments, can be problematic, they point to different solutions. The first one is that those 
problems could be tackled by national anti-cyclical fiscal policies/automatic stabilisers (BMF, GM). 
The second solution is that, rather than through transfers, shocks could also be absorbed by 
labour and capital mobility (BDA, BK). 
 
On the legal side, politicians fear the likely required treaty change. Both German and French actors 
perceive such change as politically inopportune (Trésor, CDU, GM, BK).  
 
Looking forward, actors think that the focus on investment is more politically opportune at 
present (SPD, IGM, DGB, UMP, PS, Economie, BK). Especially for the left-wing actors, the end of 
austerity and the fostering of investment is the most important priority. So they prefer to use 
their political capital to promote investment rather than actively support an AFS.  
 
                                                 
63 c.f. e.g. Eder (2013). EU will Riesen-Krisen-Fonds gegen Arbeitslosigkeit. Die Welt. Retrieved February 2015 from 
http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article120583217/EU-will-Riesen-Krisen-Fonds-gegen-Arbeitslosigkeit.html 
64 Front National. (2015). Une Europe au service des peuples libres. Retrieved February 7, 2015, from 
 http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/politique-etrangere/europe/ 
65 Alternative für Deutschland. (2014). Mut zu Deutschland. Für ein Europa der Vielfalt. Retrieved from 
https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Europaprogramm-der-AfD.pdf 
Alternative für Deutschland. (2015). Fragen und Antworten zur Euro- und Währungspolitik. Retrieved March 10, 2015, from 
http://www.alternativefuer.de/programm-hintergrund/fragen-und-antworten/zu-euro-und-waehrungspolitik/ 
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5.2 Arguments particular to one of the three policy proposals 
 
Among those that expressed an explicit preference, DGB, CFDT, PS and SPD favour a reinsurance 
while the Trésor and Economie have a preference for the EUI. In this section, more detailed 
accounts of the arguments for and against specific proposals are presented.  
 
European Unemployment Insurance 
 
The main advantage of the EUI is its expected impact on macro-economic stabilisation since it 
directly stabilises demand (BMAS, Emploi). Moreover, the EUI is the most visible instrument that 
could foster solidarity among EU citizens (Grüne, Economie, PS, Emploi, Trésor). An EUI could also 
contribute to the creation of a European social model, as it generates incentives to align national 
policies (Trésor). It could be a first step towards a European social welfare regime (Grüne). 
 
Yet, most actors perceive this pressure for harmonisation as the main disadvantage of an EUI 
(SPD, IGM, GM, BMF, BMAS, BDA, Emploi, FS, CFDT, BK CDU, DIE LINKE (Linke)). National 
unemployment insurances differ from one member state to another, on many dimensions: 
contribution, eligibility rules, replacement rates, duration, etc. The involvement of social partners 
in governance also varies. Additionally, active labour market policies differ greatly, for instance 
with regards to obligations of the unemployed towards the public employment services. Again, 
other member states use “Kurzarbeit” 66  as a passive labour market policy. Employment 
protection policies also influence labour market risks by creating distinct practices of hiring and 
firing. Adding the differences in the degree of integration of unemployment insurance, health and 
invalid insurance, pension schemes, education systems and the general inequalities between the 
economic structures of various member states, it becomes clear that the risk covered by one 
national unemployment insurance scheme is very particular. Therefore, the CFDT concluded that 
an EUI would only come at the end of a convergence process. However, not all actors agree that 
this convergence is even desirable and some fear that convergence implies convergence to a 
lower standard (Grüne, CFDT, IGM, Linke).  
 
Likewise, trade unions and leftist actors fear that the EUI could be an excuse to lower the 
unemployment insurance standards (CFDT, Grüne, IGM, Linke, SPD). As the EUI provides a 
benchmark, employers could create pressure to lower the national standard to the basic EUI to 
create a level playing field within the EMU (CFDT).  
 
Some actors (SPD, Emploi, CFDT) point out that the goal of the EUI is very different from the goal 
of national unemployment insurance schemes. The latter insures the income stream of employees 
against the risk of unemployment, targeting the micro level. As the primary goal of the EUI is 
economic stabilisation at the macro level, they argue that it should not be called EUI nor be 
integrated in national unemployment insurance schemes. The two preceding arguments are in 
line with Scharpf’s hypotheses about the opposition of left-wing actors to integrate social policies.  
 
For some of the left-wing actors (SPD, Grüne, Linke, DGB67) it is also questionable whether the 
cost of the macro-economic stabilisation of the EMU should be carried by those who pay social 
security contributions, meaning the lower and middle classes (due to a lower assessment ceiling, 
contributions to unemployment insurance are relatively more regressive in Germany). 
                                                 
66 “Kurzarbeit’ offers companies the possibility to temporarily cut the hours of their employees instead of firing them. As employees 
work fewer hours, their salaries shrink. Part of this loss is covered by the unemployment insurance. 
67  Wettach & Krumrey (2014). Andors Pläne stoßen auf breite Ablehnung. Wirtschafts Woche. Retrieved February 2015 from 
http://www.wiwo.de/politik/europa/europaeische-arbeitslosen 
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Reinsurance 
 
So far, actors have discussed the proposal of a reinsurance less intensively. However, many actors 
that either knew about the proposal or grasped the concept after a short explanation by the 
interviewer reacted positively to the suggestion. For many it seems to be a more acceptable 
solution since the flows and stocks of transfers are smaller (CFDT, Emploi) and as it is only 
activated during times of crisis (Grüne, PS, DGB, SPD). Hence, the resources needed to reach the 
same effect of stabilisation are lower (CDFT). Help in times of crisis is also more acceptable to 
citizens (SPD) than permanent money flows. 
 
As it is not directly integrated with national unemployment insurance schemes, the necessary 
degree of harmonisation seems smaller (PS, CFDT, FS, DGB, Grüne). For the actors favouring an 
EUI in the long term, the reinsurance could be further developed, acting as a stepping stone 
(Economie, Trésor, Grüne). 
 
Yet, the proposal also has some major disadvantages. First, during good times, a large sum of 
money could be accumulated. Actors are suspicious about whether politicians will refrain from 
diverting the funds to other purposes (GM, Emploi, FS). Moreover, the threshold creates a time 
lag (BMAS) as the scheme is only activated once a certain level of crisis is reached. Acting 
immediately at the beginning of a developing crisis could be cheaper than reacting later. 
 
Cyclical Shock Insurance 
 
The CSI is the lesser-known proposal and nobody has expressed a preference for the CSI. The most 
prominent critique relates to the indicator (output gap) the instrument is based on (GM, IGM, 
BMAS, DGB, Trésor, PS, Emploi, Eco, FS, CFDT). These actors mentioned that the output gap 
already led to discussions at the EU level in relation to the SGP. The problem relates to the 
definition of potential output, which is very difficult to assess, especially in times of crisis. The 
second major objection to the CSI is its potential to have pro-cyclical effects due to its reaction to 
symmetric shocks or the indicator it is based on (GM, DGB, BMAS, Trésor). Actors in favour of an 
AFS also argue that the CSI is a very limited instrument since it does not include a social dimension 
and therefore lacks visibility (Trésor, PS). 
 
6 Discussion of hypotheses 
 
The discussion confirms or disproves the hypotheses. It first looks at the hypotheses at the actor 
level and at the main reasons for their positions. In line with Moravcsik’s liberal 
intergovernmentalism, these positions are aggregated at the national level to understand the 
European bargaining constellation. Moreover, according to Scharpf’s actor-centred 
institutionalism, institutions at the European level also influence the bargain process. The 
bargaining at the European level is discussed by the second set of hypotheses.  
 
6.1 Discuss hypotheses about actor orientation of single actors 
 
 H1: Actors who expect to be net contributors will be more opposed to the introduction of an 
AFS. 
 
Confirmed: In the short run, German actors expect to be net contributors, while French actors 
would potentially benefit, or would not contribute that much. Thus, the general pattern that 
actors who expect to be net contributors more often oppose an AFS is very apparent. Whereas 
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some actors explicitly mention that their opposition is related to their expectation of being a net 
contributor (BK, CDU, IGM), others only implicitly mention it (SPD, Grüne). Furthermore, unions 
oppose an EUI because their constituency would bear the costs (IGM, DGB). The French actors did 
not bring up this argument because they generally do not expect to be important net contributors.  
 
 H2: Actors that belong to the centre-right and generally oppose increases of redistribution at 
the national level will be more opposed than actors that favour more redistributive policies 
(centre-left with regards to welfare policies). 
 
Confirmed: In both countries, 
right-wing parties and employer 
associations are more sceptical 
towards an AFS than left-
oriented actors. This confirms 
Scharpf’s 68  observation that 
actors’ preferences are to some 
degree formed by the identity. In 
Germany, the Linke slightly 
deviates from this pattern; even 
though they are further on the 
left than the Greens, they are 
only “reluctantly open” to the 
proposal. This exception is 
explained by the next 
hypothesis. Moreover, the AfD 
does not fit neatly into the pattern because the identity-related element of being Eurosceptic trumps 
the right-left cleavage.  
 
 H3: Actors favouring 
more redistributive policies 
oppose suggestions implying a 
harmonisation of national 
welfare systems since they 
fear a harmonisation to a 
lower standard and a loss of 
power.  
Confirmed: Most left-wing 
actors, especially unions, 
directly expressed their fear of 
harmonisation (CFDT, DGB, 
Grüne, Linke, SPD). For 
example, the SPD opposes an 
EUI because they oppose 
harmonisation of national 
unemployment insurance schemes and social and labour policies more generally. With regards to 
an EUI, CFDT mentioned that opposition among unions against an EUI seems widespread. The 
hypothesis is further supported by the fact that the mentioned actors favour the proposal of a 
                                                 
68 Scharpf, F. W. (1997b). Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
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reinsurance that is less invasive to national social security systems (SPD, CFDT, DGB). Finally, the 
preference for an instrument that is not directly integrated with national unemployment 
insurance schemes also reflects the fact that social partners in both countries are involved in the 
governance of the unemployment insurance schemes and would therefore lose some of their 
power if they were to be organised at the European level.  
 
6.2 Discuss hypotheses at the intergovernmental bargaining level 
 
 Ha: Due to the capacities and decision-making procedures at the European level in 
combination with the redistributive and welfare-related implications of an AFS, an adoption is 
very unlikely. 
 
Confirmed: As the decision to introduce an AFS would need to be taken unanimously within the 
European Council69, a veto by Germany could prevent the adoption. The same is true for other 
countries such as Finland, the Netherlands or Austria. It is clear that the discussion would take on 
a different dynamic if decisions would be taken by majority voting. The widespread opposition to 
proposals that touch upon unemployment insurance confirms the hypothesis that countries with 
advanced social welfare systems fear integration of social policies because it could lead to 
convergence at a lower level. Taken together, the evidence confirms Majone’s 70  (1993) and 
Scharpf’s 71  hypotheses that the EU is badly equipped to advance redistributive and welfare 
policies.  
 
 Hb: Germany will oppose an AFS whereas France will (partly) support it due to expected net 
contributions.  
 
Partly Confirmed: Based on the actors’ positions at the national level, this is certainly true, 
especially for Germany. For the BMF, an AFS is not a necessary element for the stability of the 
eurozone. Instead, national fiscal capacities would be able to deal with cyclical economic 
developments. This line of argument shows that Germany is not willing to share part of the 
financial burden resulting from asymmetric cyclical developments. The BK added that they have 
to protect the German taxpayers. 
 
France presents a more nuanced picture. Most calculations estimate that, in the past, France 
would neither have been a large net contributor nor a large net receiver. The relatively smaller 
financial burden partially explains the French attitude. Yet, it does not entirely justify the rather 
positive position as reflected in the evidence presented above and in several reports72. Moreover, 
all ministries (Economie, Trésor, Emploi) indicated that their minister would be open for 
discussion. Generally, the risk of being a net contributor seems less threatening to France than it 
does to Germany. 
 
                                                 
69 A discussion of the legal adoption process is included in the longer version. 
70 Majone, G. (1993). The European Community between social policy and social regulation. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(2), 
153–170. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00455.x 
71 Scharpf, F. W. (1997a). Economic integration, democracy and the welfare state. Journal of European Public Policy, 4(1), 18–36. 
doi:10.1080/13501769734421; Scharpf, F. W. (2009). The double asymmetry of European integration: Or: why the EU cannot be a 
social market economy. MPlfG working paper. 
72 Bailly, D. (2013). Rapport d’information fait au nom de la commission des affaires européennes (1) sur l’approfondissement de 
l’Union économique et monétaire (No. 228). Paris.; Commission des Affaires Européennes. (2013a). Rapport d’information sur 
l'approfondissement de l'Union économique et monétaire (No. 1201). Paris.; Commission des Affaires Européennes. (2013b). Rapport 
d’information sur les progrès de l'union bancaire et de l'intégration économique au sein de l'Union économique et monétaire (No. 
1665). Paris. 
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The different economic schools of thought in Germany and France could also explain why France’s 
position somewhat diverges from its immediate financial interests. While Ordoliberalism – the 
German variant of social liberalism – is more predominant in Germany, while French economists 
tend to favour Keynesian economic thinking73. Additionally, a somewhat different understanding 
of European integration is dominant in France, as expressed by the president’s vision for the 
“intégration solidaire”74. It implies that each step of economic integration must come with more 
financial solidarity. This perception is absent in Germany. However, even though it can be said 
that France generally supports an AFS, the interviewees also made clear that the introduction of 
an AFS is no immediate priority for the ministers, nor does it seem to be a priority for the 
president. Thus, priorities might better reflect France’s financial interest than its theoretical 
position. As France presents a mixed picture, this hypothesis is only partly confirmed.  
 
 Hc: This hypothesis suggests that France and Germany could link their demands with regards 
to their fiscal preferences. Yet, the current political context prevents a compromise.  
 
Confirmed: The evidence shows that the priority for the majority of German actors is the 
implementation of structural reforms and fiscal consolidation. By contrast, French actors are 
generally supportive of more fiscal integration or even an AFS. 
 
This quid pro quo approach can be illustrated by the words of the German chancellor: “A logic is 
imbedded within this proposal, the logic that an element of solidarity, in other words an element 
of integration is coupled with an element of control and stronger commitment” 75 . When 
compared to the French president’s vision of “intégration solidaire”76 it becomes clear that both 
leaders set different priorities: Merkel emphasizes control, while Hollande stresses solidarity. The 
Trésor understood this logic and mentioned that the exchange between more solidarity and more 
structural reforms is “à l’air du temps” in Europe. The representative of the PS expressed similarly: 
“We must exchange the fiscal discipline for a transfer/solidarity mechanism.” 
 
Yet, even though both countries and their leaders acknowledge the possibility of a compromise, 
the current political context does not allow it. Due to economic difficulties in recent years, France 
is not seen as being in a position equal to that of Germany. There is also a clear commitment 
problem: France has previously assured and even signed the Fiscal Compact, but has yet to comply 
with fiscal rules.77 As not even a treaty has made France follow the rules, any further promise 
would face a credibility deficit at this moment. France first needs to comply with the rules to 
regain Germany’s confidence before it can ask for a compromise78. In sum, even though there is 
                                                 
73 Hall, P. A. (2012). The economics and politics of the euro crisis. German Politics, 21(4), 355–371. 
doi:10.1080/09644008.2012.739614 
74 Kaufmann, S. (2012). François Hollande : “L’Europe ne peut plus être en retard.” Le Monde.fr. Retrieved November 2015 from 
http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2012/10/17/francois-hollande-l-europe-ne-peut-plus-etre-en-
retard_1776532_823448.html 
75Merkel, A. (2012). Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlern Angela Merkel anl. des Europäischen Rates am 18. und 19. Oktober. 
Brussels. Retrieved from 
http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2012/10/2012-10-19-merkel-bruessel-
2.html rift Pressekonferenz 
76 Kaufmann, S. (2012). François Hollande : “L’Europe ne peut plus être en retard.” Le Monde.fr. Retrieved November 2015 from 
http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2012/10/17/francois-hollande-l-europe-ne-peut-plus-etre-en-
retard_1776532_823448.html 
77 The Commission first rejected France’s budget proposal for 2015. On February 25, after long negotiations, France received an 
extension until 2017 before they have to comply with the EU fiscal rules (“EU gives France to 2017 to cut deficit, Italy, Belgium in clear 
??? ,” 2015) 
78 Macron, E. (2015, April 31). A new deal for Europe: Reforms, investment, and growth. Berlin. 
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an intention to find a compromise in the realm of fiscal integration, a variety of factors makes it 
hard to reach it at the moment.  
 
7 Conclusion of the empirical analysis 
 
The conclusion from the empirical analysis is that in the current political context, a proposal for 
an AFS would not meet an overall favourable environment in France and Germany, and therefore 
it would not be politically feasible at the EMU-level either.  
 
Several factors explain why the political context is not conducive to major initiatives in this 
respect. First, German actors and Germany as a whole expect that they will be net contributors. 
This expectation is based on the current relatively better state of the German economy. 
Moreover, German actors assume that an ASF would introduce moral hazard and delay national 
structural reforms. This delay is expected to make Germany’s net contribution more likely in the 
future. Second, if an AFS is integrated with national social security systems, left-wing actors will 
question it because they fear harmonisation to a lower standard, while right-wing actors oppose 
more redistribution in the first place. Third, the decision-making process at the European level 
demand a unanimous decision by the European Council, which means that the veto of one country 
is enough to prevent the proposal from being adopted. However, current opposition of one or 
some member states/s does not necessarily mean a death sentence for a policy proposal. As 
always in politics, several policies that on their own would not find an approval could be linked to 
others to reach a compromise. Yet, at the intergovernmental bargaining table, France is currently 
not in the position to negotiate a compromise in the realm of fiscal integration. France is 
weakened by its economic conditions, the low public support of the president and the 
government and the inability to comply with EMU fiscal rules.  
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PART III: Make it happen! The outlook beyond 
immediate constraints 
 
8 Eurozone politics beyond Germany and France 
 
It is evident, that one of the main constraints of this analysis is its geographic limitation. Therefore, 
this section looks beyond France and Germany to put the empirical findings into context. 
 
Currently, there does not seem to be a clear pattern of polarisation within the EMU that would 
allow to generally assign member states to different groups that share either the French or the 
German position on AFS, or that would have a homogenous third stand on that issue. However, it 
is no surprise, that the first finance minister who started to campaign for EUI is Pier Carlo Padoan79 
of Italy. Centrist politicians from Luxembourg or Belgium have also supported debt mutualisation, 
while some political leaders from mainstream parties in periphery countries are faithfully 
following the policies of the Troika and the so-called Berlin consensus. Hence, we cannot make a 
final judgment about different political camps within the EMU on that issue.  
 
Looking beyond national political parties to the European political families, federalists among the 
European People’s Party and the Liberal and Democrats for Europe group, as well as progressives 
among the Social Democrats (together with the entire Green group) are in favour of deepening 
and rebalancing the EMU, though they may still differ in terms of key directions and details. Even 
though the European Parliament does not have any formal power in the decision-making process, 
its members influence national policy-making. Documents like the Five Presidents’ Report may 
help to develop more agreement at the EU level, as it is written by the most powerful EU 
politicians, all from varying political backgrounds.  
 
Last but not least, the political feasibility of the AFS is highly contingent on the European political 
context and momentum. The hostility surrounding bailout programmes and their conditionality 
have not created a good atmosphere in which more solidarity could be easily promoted in Europe, 
especially if it involves various forms of fiscal transfers (or debt relief). Other issues, like the 
refugee crisis or terrorism may keep EMU reform on the back burner. 
 
However, as we know from experience during the eurozone crisis, some reforms that just months 
before hardly seemed imaginable (ESM, Banking Union etc.), can very quickly became part of the 
consensus. However, it should not be overlooked that introducing an AFS is different from the 
European Stability Mechanism or the Banking Union. It does not solve an immediate financial 
problem. Instead, the AFS solves a creeping policy problem, which will become ever more 
dangerous as the divergence between the eurozone members persists and increases. 
 
Hence, from a purely financial perspective, AFS may not be the first choice, even if it could be an 
instrument that brings us closer to reinstating a no-bailout principle and practice, and helps 
restore citizens’ confidence in the EU project. If an AFS has to compete with the completion of 
the Banking Union (deposit insurance) on the reform agenda, it is very likely that the second will 
prevail, while both are indispensable for a prosperous and sustainable EMU. 
 
                                                 
79 Padoan, Pier Carlo (2015) Making Progress in Economic and Monetary Union. Speech delivered at University of Luxembourg, 
October 6. 
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To sum up, even though some unexpected supporters can be found, the overall context seems 
little conducive to a swift adoption of an AFS.  
 
9 Features of a more feasible model 
 
The empirical analysis so far has found the prospects on an AFS to be adopted in the near future 
to be rather gloomy. This result is disappointing, as the authors share the assumption that 
divergence in the eurozone is a destabilising factors and that some kind of AFS is needed for the 
sake of sustainability, a greater growth potential, and a more balanced distribution of the benefits 
of the EMU80 (see Dolls et.al. 2014, Brandolini et.al. 2014). The question is what elements of the 
alternative models need to be highlighted or strengthened to design a proposal that can gather 
more support. As a contribution to the process to create an acceptable solution for as many 
stakeholders as possible, this last section discusses the key features that could bring any kind of 
AFS closer to feasibility.  
 
The interviews conducted contained a section that questioned the actors on their preferences 
concerning the different dimensions of the proposals (cf. Appendix 2). The answers to these 
questions serve to determine the most feasible proposal, which is represented in Figure 781.   
 
 
                                                 
80 Dolls, M., Fuest, C., Neumann, D., & Peichl, A. (2014). An unemployment insurance scheme for the euro area? A comparison of 
different alternatives using micro data. A Comparison of Different Alternatives Using Micro Data (October 28, 2014). ZEW-Centre for 
European Economic Research Discussion Paper, (14-095).; Brandolini, A., F. Carta and F. D’Amuri (2014), “A feasible unemployment-
based shock absorber for the euro area”, Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) No. 254, Banca d’Italia, Rome. 
 
81However, the weakness of this part of the analysis is that most actors in the category ‘total rejection’ did not answer these questions 
because they would not even enter this stage of the conversation. Hence, this section presents the most feasible proposition from 
the point of view of the actors that are at least reluctantly open to the proposal.  
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As mentioned in section 7, some supportive actors reject a EUI based on the interference with 
national unemployment insurance schemes and instead prefer a reinsurance mechanism (CFDT, 
SPD, parts of the Grüne, DGB). Moreover, those that support a EUI (Trésor, Economie) indicated 
that they would not oppose a reinsurance. Nearly all actors opposed the CSI. Hence, the most 
feasible proposal is based on the reinsurance, reflecting the following arguments about the 
dimensions of the proposal: 
 
 Payments are linked to short-term (cyclical) unemployment. Payments should be calculated 
on the basis of a common indicator of short-term unemployment.  
 The instrument should result in the counter-cyclical redistribution of funds over time and 
between member states. This implies temporary debt issuance. 
 Permanent transfers should be avoided. A claw-back mechanism should minimise permanent 
transfers and avoid a sharp divergence between net contributors and net recipients in the 
long run, and combat moral hazard. 
 Clear rules have to define the management of monetary stocks and flows. These rules also 
include a provision to prevent long-term indebtedness of the instrument as a whole.  
 Funding the scheme is a key question, but it is a relatively open one. We therefore suggest 
that, if the chosen scheme allows for it, each member state should be free to define how to 
raise its annual contributions. 
 The support for direct payments to the national unemployment insurance fund is relatively 
strong, yet actors also showed some opposition to proposals that are integrated with national 
unemployment insurances. Thus, some flexibility should be tested. (For instance, rather than 
handing payments directly to national unemployment insurance funds, they could be 
earmarked for specific purposes that stabilise demand, such as social benefits, cutting taxes 
on low wages, etc.) 
 Though we speak about automatic stabilisers, control over and oversight of the scheme 
remains important. A body composed by representatives of member states and European 
institutions could monitor implementation. Monitoring would include, among others, the 
oversight of the reported data of short-term unemployment and the determining of when the 
threshold is reached, and checking whether the spending is in accordance with predefined 
criteria. Social partners at the EU level could be involved, or member states should be 
encouraged to involve social partners’ representatives at national level. The EP should be 
represented with the capacity of democratic oversight.82  
 An AFS has a better chance of being adopted if it is promoted as part of the EMU fiscal reform, 
as opposed to the social agenda. In the political discourse, the instrument needs to set apart 
from national social security systems. Discussing an ‘automatic fiscal stabiliser’ (AFS) can open 
more hearts and minds than a ‘European unemployment insurance’ (EUI). 
 
  
                                                 
82 This suggestion leads to the problem that the European Parliament includes members from all EU member states and not only 
the eurozone. 
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Table 3 (see below) shows how the features of the most feasible policy proposal correspond to 
the guiding principles set out in the FPR. It indicates that these features meet all the criteria of 
the FPR. 
 
Table 3: Guiding principles set out in the Five Presidents’ Report 
Guiding principles set out in the FPR (Juncker, 2015, p. 15) 
No permanent transfers ✔ 
Not meant to equalise incomes ✔ 
Not undermining incentives for sound fiscal policies and 
addressing structural weaknesses 
✔ 
Linked to broad EU governance framework Must be developed 
Developed within the framework of the EU treaty change is likely 
Open & transparent for all member states ✔ 
Improve economic resilience and prevent crises  ✔ 
 
Perhaps the most feasible model is not the same as the most powerful one drawn up by experts 
in recent years, but it would already make a difference. Economically it would help to rebalance 
and make the European economy more sustainable, politically it would signal the commitment of 
the EU to maintain the single currency, and from a social point of view it would signal solidarity 
with those whose jobs and living conditions have been undermined by reckless financial practices 
and the failure of political leaders to prepare the single currency for major shocks. 
 
The dramatic momentum needed for a sudden paradigm shift may not be here at the moment. 
But the time is certainly right for a serious and deep reflection among stakeholders, political forces 
and EU member states. In fact, this might be the last time that the road towards a better 
functioning EMU is still open. If this opportunity is missed, and divergence and asymmetries are 
not dealt with, continuing economic stagnation could turn even greater shares of the electorate 
against the euro, and demands for more growth and jobs will be coupled with suggestions to 
abolish the single currency. This paper aimed to support leaders and their experts to work 
together towards genuine reforms, as long as public support can be mobilised for the completion 
of the EMU. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Legal considerations - Under which procedures could an AFS be adopted? 
 
To study political feasibility, we need to understand the legal procedures set in place for the 
adoption of an AFS. This section therefore provides an overview of the legal ways an AFS could be 
adopted: 
 
Most (conservative) scholars agree that the adoption of an AFS requires treaty change83 . In this 
case, unanimity within the Council – composed of the heads of state or government – and 
ratification by national parliaments is required. However, other scholars argue that some specific 
models of the EUI could be based on Art. 153 TFEU84. Or, some aspects of a fiscal capacity could 
be based on Art. 352 TFEU combined with enhanced cooperation by the participating member 
states 85 . Yet, both options imply limitations on the possible design of an AFS. Thus, the 
implementation of an AFS that best serves its own purpose, rather than being designed to fit 
within the existing Treaties, most likely requires treaty change. However, as EU legislators have 
been inventive in the past, possibilities of an adoption under primary law still need to be 
discussed; Art. 153 TFEU demands unanimity in the Council, whereas a solution on the basis of 
Art. 352 TFEU requires unanimity among member states participating in the enhanced 
cooperation: neither requires ratification by national parliaments. Hence, if a satisfactory 
proposal could be designed that falls under either art. 153 or Art. 352 TFEU only the European 
level has to explicitly agree. With regards to the European Parliament, its role is limited in any 
case. The European Parliament has no decision-making power in case of treaty change. Art. 352 
only demands the consent (the so-called assent procedure) of the European Parliament, while 
Art. 153 requires the Council to consult the parliament. 
 
In sum, a decision to adopt an AFS must be taken unanimously by the Council. In case of treaty 
change, national parliaments have to ratify the change while the European Parliament has no 
decision-making power. In case an AFS could be designed to fall under current primary law, the 
European Parliament would only have very limited power. 
 
  
                                                 
83 European Commission. (2012). A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union: Launching a European debate. 
Brussels, p.33. 
84 Repasi, R. (2012). A study on the legal feasibility of perspectives of reforms towards a genuine European economic and monetary 
union. Brantner, Franziska; Giegold Sven, pp.75. 
85 Repasi, R. (2013). Legal options for an additional EMU fiscal capacity. 
 32 
Appendix 2: Dimensions of policy proposals 
 
To analyse actors’ specific positions they were not only asked about their opinion on policy 
proposals but they were also confronted with the dimensions that are relevant to the proposals. 
This allowed isolating specific preferences independent of a proposal to determine the 
parameters for the most feasible proposal.  
 
Dimension Criteria Possible Values 
Possibility of debt 
issuance  
Can the European fund issue debt? Yes; No 
Nature of economic 
shock absorbed 
(amplitude) 
Does the amplitude of the shock matter 
whether or not payment is triggered? 
Yes; No 
Nature of economic 
shock absorbed 
(evenness across 
economies) 
Does the instrument capture 
exclusively asymmetric shocks? 
Yes; No 
Nature of payments 
rates among 
member states 
Are relative payments equal among 
member states? 
(E.g. do all employees/employers pay 
the same percentage of wages into the 
fund? Do all states pay the same 
percentage of GDP into the fund?) 
Homogenous payment 
rate; heterogeneous 
payment rate (=claw-back 
mechanism) 
Recipients of 
disbursement 
Who is the recipient of the funds? 
 
member states; employees 
Source of funding Who provides the funds? 
 
member states; employees 
& employers 
Indicator 
triggering/defining 
money flow 
What indicator is the money flow based 
on? 
 
Employment status; output 
gap 
Governance: 
implementation 
Who makes the day-to-day decisions? 
Who administrates the European fund? 
ECB; COM; Member States; 
technical agency; social 
partners 
(Several values possible) 
Governance: 
democratic oversight 
How is democratic oversight 
guaranteed? 
National parliaments; 
European parliament; 
European social partners; 
national government;  
(Several values possible) 
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Appendix 3: Interview Guide 
 
The following interview guide is the raw guide that served as a basis for the interviews, which 
were tailored to each actor. 
 
1. Have you in your function ever come across a proposal of an AFS fort the eurozone? Could you 
please describe me your work related to it? 
2. Within your organisation, have you already established an official position vis à vis any 
proposals of an AFS? 
3. How did you come to that conclusion/What do you base your conclusion on? 
4. Within your organisation, have you discussed different proposals of an AFS? Do you prefer 
any of the suggestions – on what grounds? 
a. EUI 
b. CSI 
c. Reinsurance 
d. Others? 
Transition: Analysing the different proposals, several questions arise with regards to the fundamental 
elements of such proposals. For instance, should an AFS be able to issue debt? Or, should permanent 
transfers be minimised through a claw-back mechanism? I am going to ask you about these 
fundamental elements. Please indicate if these elements are crucial for your approval/disapproval and 
what your preference would be.  
 
 Can the European fund issue debt? 
 Does the amplitude of the shock matter whether or not payment is triggered? (payment in times 
of crisis or continuous smoothing) 
 Does the instrument capture exclusively asymmetric shocks? 
 Are relative payments equal among member states? (claw-back mechanism) 
 Who is the recipient of the funds? 
 Who provides the funds? 
 What indicator is the money flow based on? 
 Who makes the day-to-day decisions? 
 Who administrates the European fund? 
 How is democratic oversight guaranteed? 
 
5. Do you prefer other macro-economic reforms within the EMU to the AFS? 
6. If the national economy would enter into a recession later this year, would your voters/members 
hold you accountable for it? 
7. If the EMU economy would enter into a recession later this year, would your voters/members 
hold you accountable for it? Would European voters hold you accountable for it? 
8. Would you like to add anything? 
